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Abstract 
Local government associations (LGAs) are neglected in the intergovernmental relations and 
interest group literatures. This article argues that they form a key element in central-local 
relations. They contribute towards defending local democracy and local discretion through 
their three roles as the collective voices of local authorities, as countervailing public interest 
groups in political systems dominated by private interests and as feedback mechanisms for 
central government actors distant from the localities. LGAs are understood as hybrid 
organisations, combining governmental and interest group characteristics, and their role and 
influence analysed in terms of (1) the relationship between central government and LGAs; (2) 
LGAs’ capacity to manage the dilemmas of collectively representing territorial heterogeneity, 
maintain and even mobilise its membership and deploy its resources; and (3) the extent of 
competition from other political and functional interests. These roles are illustrated through a 
comparative analysis of LGAs in England, Germany and the Netherlands.  
 
Introduction 
Local government associations are an under-researched topic. In their comparative local 
government collection Goldsmith and Page (2010, p. 259) conclude by stressing the 
‘continuing and growing importance of national associations representing local government 
interests and a decline in the importance of personal contacts between local elected officials 
and higher levels of government’. They argue that local authorities’ freedom of action or 
discretion depends crucially on their access to higher-levels of government, either collectively 
(e.g. through LGAs) or individually (via clientelistic/personal links). Meanwhile, higher-level 
actors also manage their relationships with localities through collective negotiations with local 
government representative bodies. Yet Page, Goldsmith and their contributors provide little 
evidence and no further conceptual analysis of the role and influence of LGAs while other 
publications, such as Loughlin, Hendriks and Lidström (2012), ignore them completely. LGAs 
are little covered in the local government and interest group literatures with the notable 
exceptions of Rhodes (1986), Entwistle and Laffin (2003), Cigler (2012) on the US, Schott 
(2015) on Canada, and Callanan (2012) on LGAs in the EU.  
This article contributes to the intergovernmental and interest group literatures by 
providing conceptual analysis and evidence through a comparative study of LGAs. Local 
governments’ economic and political context has changed substantially since Goldsmith and 
Page and they are now under considerable financial pressure. Three questions are posed. 
Firstly, are local government interests better placed to resist centralization in countries with 
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apparently stronger protections in constitutional institutions or traditions? Secondly, can local 
government collectively through LGAs effectively defend its interests when central 
governments tighten their control over localities and spending, especially given the challenges 
of collectively representing territorial heterogeneity? Thirdly, do other intergovernmental 
linkages, the parties and professional-bureaucratic channels, compete with or complement 
LGAs? As will be seen, LGAs’ influence with central governments depends on the institutional 
relationship with central (and state) governments, LGAs’ capacity to manage the representative 
and collective action problems confronting them as national representatives of local diversity 
and democracy, and the role of other critical interest groupings – especially the political parties 
and technocratic/professional-bureaucratic complexes – which also coordinate 
intergovernmental relationships. 
 
LGAs as hybrid organizations 
LGAs are hybrid organisations combining both interest group and governmental 
characteristics. They resemble interest groups in that they lobby governments but are ‘not just 
another special interest’ as they pursue ‘benefits not limited to their members’ (Cigler, 2012; 
Rhodes, 1986, pp. 11-12). Firstly, they claim legitimacy as they represent elected governments 
so are subject to public accountability in contrast to private sector organisations, especially as 
they provide a counterbalance to private and sectoral interests. Secondly, this legitimacy means 
that they typically enjoy insider, high-level access to ministers and officials, available to few 
other interest groups. This access also reflects the extent to which central policymakers 
recognise LGAs as providers of valuable, bottom-up feedback, aggregating information from 
diverse localities. Thirdly, they are ‘topocratic’ as their authority is territorially based and 
defined as opposed to functionally-based, ‘technocrats’ whose interests are limited to particular 
services (Beer, 1978; Rhodes, 1986, p. 12) and to partisans or party politicians whose interests 
typically trump those of territory. This hybrid status is analysed in three parts: (1) the 
relationship between central government and LGAs; (2) LGAs capacity to manage the 
dilemmas of collectively representing territorial heterogeneity, to mobilise its membership and 
deploy its resources; and (3) the extent of competition from other political and social interests.   
 
1. LGAs as corporatist partners or pluralistic players 
LGAs’ intermediating role can be located along a pluralist-corporatist continuum. In pluralist 
intermediation, a LGA is a player in a pluralist arena competing with other interests and 
resorting primarily to the characteristic interest group strategies of lobbying ministers, senior 
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officials and parliamentarians, and forming allegiances with other interest groups. In 
corporatist intermediation a LGA is a privileged peak body in close partnership with central 
government, which plays ‘a leading role in orchestrating interest group participation in the 
policy process’ (Granados & Knoke, 2005, p. 293). An LGA negotiates with central 
government and can offer central actors guarantees that any agreements made will be 
implemented by their members. At the same time LGA leaders are caught in the classic, 
corporatist tension (Streeck & Kenworthy, 2002) between pursuing ‘a logic of influence’, what 
they need to do to influence regional or national actors, and a ‘logic of membership’, what they 
have to do to ensure their members implement any agreements made with government.  
Typically, LGAs enjoy good access to central policy makers. This access may indicate 
political significance, but it does not necessarily mean influence. Nonetheless, access does 
provide LGA actors with opportunities to become aware of how issues are perceived by central 
policymakers and of any policy initiatives earlier rather than later in the policy process; and 
‘[b]y being in the process, [interest groups] are in a position to achieve partial gains and to 
avoid the even larger losses that might have ensued had they not been on the scene (Schlozman 
at al., 2012, p. 309). Indeed, the extent of contacts with members of parliament, access to the 
bureaucracy and media presence are relevant proxy measures of interest group influence given 
the difficulties of measuring interest group influence (Eising, 2016). Of course, access may 
come at a price as central policymakers can use access as a strategy to capture or coopt LGA 
leaders. 
Given the difficulties of assessing influence, LGAs’ influence should be judged against 
what might be expected of other interest groups. Interest groups are only occasionally 
associated with major change as the political system status quo tends to be unchanging (cf. 
Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball & Leech, 2009). To exercise influence they are highly 
dependent on change-supporting windows of opportunity, resources of expertise and strong 
alliances with other actors. Not unexpectedly, then, LGAs have often not succeeded in halting 
major central government policy initiatives, especially relating to the overall control of public 
spending and burden-shifting services downwards. Moreover, evidence of policy influence is 
more likely to be during implementation rather than agenda-setting or decision-making points 
in the policy-making process.   
Interest group lobbying is not necessarily about changing actors’ minds. Chalmers 
(2011) argues that the literature indicates that groups generally support sympathetic 
policymakers, ‘they tend to lobby friends, not foes’ (p. 472). Thus, interest groups should be 
seen as ‘service bureaus’ which offer a ‘form of professional labour to friendly decision-
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makers’ (Chalmers, 2011, p 472). Although ‘service bureau’ understates the aggressive (but 
seldom public) influence exercised by many business lobbies (Scholzman, Verba & Brady, 
2012), the phrase captures LGAs’ emphasis on providing information and expert opinion to 
central actors. It is important also to recognise that many LGA activities serve general 
objectives like safer streets, rubbish collection and recycling, environmental health regulations, 
issues which affect everyone but which seldom make the political headlines. 
 
2. LGAs and collective action and representation 
LGAs have to mobilise and maintain their membership to be effective in lobbying central 
government but face internal collective action problems (Cigler, 2012, p. 266, drawing on 
Olson 1965). LGAs provide collective benefits to their members, such as a unified voice on 
intergovernmental issues, but many of these benefits could be enjoyed by non-members free-
riding on an association. Moreover, many individual authorities prioritise their search for 
special treatment or funding for themselves over joining collective action. To encourage local 
governments to belong, then, LGAs offer selective benefits to members – such as policy 
updates, other policy reports, conferences with key influential speakers and specific advice to 
authorities (Schott, 2015, p. 165). As Schott argues, LGAs have to balance advocacy against 
member services, if they are perceived as dedicating too much resource to advocacy rather than 
member services, members may withdraw support.   
However, the collective action problem also arises as LGA leaders puzzle over 
collective representation – forming policy responses and positions despite being ‘a 
contradiction in terms’ as they represent local concerns nationally (Rhodes, 1986, p. 404). They 
have to generalize when their defence of local government necessarily celebrates local diversity 
and develop national policy stances while their members are focussed on ‘local’ problems 
(Rhodes, 1986, p. 405). At the same time, they are divided by cleavages such as rural/urban 
divide, big city/towns, institutional status (e.g. county v district) and declining/growing areas.  
 Central policymakers face similar problems in making policy but they have to consider 
society-wide redistributive and regulatory perspective and functions. They tend to perceive 
problems in terms of territorial equality, service quality, cost and functional/service-based 
coordination. Central government policymakers need to generalise for instance over 
determining territorial funding formula to limit, at least excessively, unequal funding across 
local governments. Typically, central policymakers reference arguments about avoiding 
postcode lotteries service in quality and the search for coordination. Yet politically contentious 
and partisan issues are often couched in secrecy with LGAs excluded from discussions. 
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3. LGAs in a competitive arena  
Intergovernmental relations cannot be understood solely in terms of territorially-based, centre-
LGA relations. Two other sets of interests are involved – the party political and the 
professional-bureaucratic – neither of which necessarily align with territorially-based local 
government interests. Firstly, the relationship between parties and LGAs is critical (omitted 
from Goldsmith & Page, 2010). The political parties are the engines of major change, rather 
than interest groups, yet only recently have authors explored the role of parties in coordinating 
government policy (e.g. Bolleyer, 2011; Laffin, Shaw & Taylor, 2007). Secondly, tensions 
exist between territorial interests and those within the big spending service or department-based 
vertical channels (such as education, social services and health) linking governmental levels. 
These links are top-down, with a tendency to identify local governments as agents of the centre. 
Meanwhile, the central, or state-level, government department responsible for local 
government often strains to assert the local, territorial interest within government against the 
powerful service departments.  
 
CASES AND METHODS 
Three Northern European governmental systems are selected rather than Southern European 
systems, where municipalities are less significant than clientelistic linkages (Goldsmith & 
Page, 2010). In all three countries, local government is responsible for roughly a quarter of 
public spending, and offer telling institutional contrasts to enable comparison – England is a 
majoritarian system with no formal constitutional protection for local government, Germany a 
federal constitutional system with some formal protection for councils, and the Netherlands a 
decentralized-unitary state with local government embedded in a consensual-corporatist 
system. In Germany, the research concentrates on the federal government and the state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany’s largest state which Kuhlmannn and Wollmann (2014, 
p. 169) assign a Northern European profile. The three countries have large municipalities by 
European standards, with average populations in the UK (139,480), Netherlands (36,890), and 
NRW (45,447) (Kuhlmannn & Wollmann, 2014, p.168, 165). The research draws on 48 
interviews, statistical data and documentary sources gathered in a study of the 
intergovernmental management of debt (further evidence in De Widt, 2015; and De Widt, 
2016), and the authors have updated it through secondary sources. As regards the distribution 
of the interviews, 15 interviews were conducted in England, 14 in Germany, and 19 in the 
Netherlands. Interviews were conducted during 2013-14 with officials in the LGAs, and state 
and central level policymakers, including officials in the Finance and Interior Ministries.  
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The next section provides case studies of LGAs in the three countries to illustrate the 
issues. Each case begins by describing the constitutional position and the role of formal and 
informal institutional arrangements, the dilemmas of interest representation for LGAs and the 
impact of current issues, especially austerity with associated cutbacks and burden-shifting, on 
the roles of LGAs. The final section, then, summarises the strengths and weaknesses of LGAs, 
and how the institutional context in which they operate impacts upon their position.  
 
LGA STRATEGIES IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARENA 
England 
English local government is subject to a powerful political executive which dominates 
Parliament and can abolish or reform councils to an extent unparalleled elsewhere in Europe. 
England is also characterised by a ‘lack of consistent channels of influence and contact between 
the centre and the localities’ comparable to those found in most other European countries (John 
& Copus, 2012, p. 35). Two other key features are the absence of constitutional protections and 
of an active judicial institution – while judicial review is possible, the few court cases heard 
have largely proven unsuccessful for local government (Wilson & Game, 2011, p. 174 
The unified Local Government Association was created in 1997 through a merger of 
the three previous associations which had separately represented county councils, metropolitan 
councils and districts. The merger was urged by central government and the political parties 
largely in the interests of avoiding ‘pointless’ turf wars among the three associations (Entwistle, 
2002). The merger meant that for central government actors much of the political awkwardness 
of managing institutional and territorial diversity was devolved to the LGA leadership. 
Presently the LGA represents 349 out of the 353 English local authorities, and all of the 22 
Welsh local authorities via the Welsh LGA. The LGA has a County Council Network, Districts 
Network and the Metropolitan Special Interest Group among other internal Groups reflecting 
persistent cleavages. It also has mechanisms such as understandings not to make specific 
policies on especially divisive issues (e.g. over local government reorganisation), and internal 
party organisations and conventions to restrain the potentially disruptive impact of party 
politics. Regional LGAs also exist – most notably the Welsh LGA and ‘London Councils’ 
representing all the London Boroughs (three London Boroughs do not belong to the LGA). The 
LGA’s income (2016-17) is just under £20m, half of which is member subscriptions, and 
employs over 30 staff (75 senior officers). The LGA also has an agency, the Local Government 
Improvement and Development almost entirely funded by a £30m central government grant. 
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Over recent years, LGA political and official leaders have faced difficult issues in 
maintaining its membership. It has been challenged by the larger cities in particular, for 
instance the eight ‘core cities’ threatened to withdraw in 2013, concerned that the LGA did not 
fully represented their interests. Meanwhile, the LGA relationship with central government has 
fluctuated largely depending on central-LGA party congruency and different ministerial 
personalities. The LGA, then Conservative, political leaders found themselves incidental to the 
2011-17 emergence of the new combined authorities much as its predecessor associations had 
limited influence in earlier local government reorganizations. However, they would argue that 
they have had a significant influence in persuading Conservative ministers to extend the 
combined authorities initiative to include less urbanised areas. Furthermore, the election of 
high-profile, sub-regional mayors in 2017 poses new challenges as the new mayors forge their 
own direct relationships with ministers. The 1997-2010 Labour government did establish the 
Central Local Partnership which hinged around regular ministerial-LGA meetings but these 
meetings stopped in 2007, following poor ministerial attendance, especially from the critical 
big service departments. The low status of the territorial-based Department of Communities 
and Local Government (DCLG), compared with the big service departments, also tends to 
weaken the LGA. At one point the LGA even suggested that DCLG’s responsibilities should 
be transferred to the Cabinet Office. Notably, the LGA expends considerable resource in 
lobbying the two Houses of Parliament and claims considerable success in achieving legislative 
modifications, especially in the House of Lords.  
Since 2010 UK central government-imposed austerity has meant large cuts in the 
central block grant. The Conservative-led coalition (2010-15) cut council expenditure by 27%, 
exceeding the 19% central departmental average. The subsequent Conservative governments 
have continued these cuts and increasing numbers of English councils are at risk of failing their 
statutory duties and are using reserves (CIPFA, 2015). Perhaps not entirely coincidentally, 
central government grant calculations have become ever more complex. The House of 
Commons’ Public Accounts Committee concludes that ‘it is virtually impossible to follow the 
link between calculated needs and funding allocations’ (PAC, 2011, p. 5). Two local 
government interviewees referred to the system as ‘broken’ and that ‘no one any longer 
understands where the number [the grant allocation] comes from’. The UK Treasury does not 
negotiate with the LGA political leadership over financial settlements but only consults the 
LGA and council professionals over technical issues. Officially, financial settlements reflect 
need assessments but party-political considerations have long influenced weightings in the 
assessments, which has reduced the adverse financial effects of centrally-imposed austerity 
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measures for councils when national-local party-political symmetry exists (De Widt, 2016; 
Ward & John, 1999).  
The LGA has acquired responsibility for a new Sector-Led Improvement (SLI) 
replacing Labour’s centrally-directed performance management system. SLI is a voluntary 
programme of peer review challenges conducted by local authority leaders, chief executives 
and other senior officers. SLI is based on the principles that authorities should be responsible 
for their own performance and improvement and take collective responsibility for the 
performance of the sector (evidenced by sharing best practice, offering member and officer 
peers etc.). The SLI looks like a strong assertion of localism against almost 30 years of 
centralism through regulatory intensification by previous Conservative and Labour 
governments. However, Murphy and Jones (2016, p. 699) argue that the voluntary nature of 
SLI raises the question of how persistent underperformance by a local authority will be 
managed in the absence of central intervention.  
 
Germany 
The German federal system provides the strongest constitutional protection for municipalities, 
out of the three countries, although, unlike the states (Länder), they are not incorporated into 
the Federal Council (Bundesrat). While the state governments have constitutional 
responsibility for local government, a federal constitutional guarantee of local self-government 
exists guaranteeing that councils should be able to fix part of their budget by local preferences 
(Buettner, Holm-Hadulla, Parsche, & Starbatty, 2008, p. 14). The consultation of local interest 
associations has also become mandatory in all states (Vetter, 2010, p. 104) and all state 
governments after 2004 incorporated Connectivity Principles into their constitution to limit the 
extent to which they can pass unfunded responsibilities onto municipalities. Nationally German 
local government interests are represented by three associations – the German Association of 
Cities (the 216 larger cities); the County Association (295 counties); and the Association of 
Towns and Municipalities (12,500 smaller municipalities). The associations are organized 
federally with branches in all thirteen states (Hrbek & Bodenbender, 2007) and have formed a 
Federal Union of LGAs. These associations appear well funded and resourced, certainly in 
comparison with the English LGA, although we have not been able to obtain precise details of 
their budgets.  
Although NRW lacks an independent grant allocation commission (unlike some 
German states), the grant allocation process is more transparently organized than in England 
and the Netherlands. This transparency involves just five indicators in the general grants 
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distribution formula and prioritizes population size. Even so this redistribution mechanism 
creates much inter-local controversy, given heterogeneous local interests. Although those 
interviewed in the LGAs stressed their common positions, the LGAs consistently failed to 
reach consensus on finance-related issues. The redistribution system is especially contentious 
as every change within the funding system has implications for which type of authority gets 
what. Thus, the NRW Interior Ministry has to balance the advantages of simplicity in a grant 
system against that of minimizing inter-local tensions. The advantage is that transparency and 
simplicity in grant funding makes it more difficult for both local and state level actors to 
manipulate grant allocations. In particular, undue partisan influence is easily detected. The 
straightforward design, too, means that local officers can calculate their allocation once the 
total funding amount is announced and so the system generates high certainty. 
Federally, LGAs are also crowded out by a lack of shared interests amongst the states. 
The view of NRW Finance Ministry officials was that they had little scope to influence the 
Federal Council legislative process given divergent state interests. The NRW representatives 
on the Council, in particular, found themselves out of line with many other states because of 
the more problematic condition of local government finances in NRW compared to the 
southern German states. Once Germany’s industrial heartland, substantial parts of NRW have 
undergone significant economic decline with consequent social problems. Yet NRW remains 
the major, net contributing state to the federal level equalization mechanism. The consequent 
financial squeeze has led the NRW government to require its local authorities to contribute to 
the state’s federal equalization system. The East German states’ special financial position 
further complicates NRW’s efforts to build a coalition within the Federal Council. As the 
eastern states remain dependent on additional federal financial support, they tend to support 
federal legislative initiatives.  
Municipalities face escalating welfare costs mainly following the transfer of social 
welfare tasks from the federal to the local level. This transfer took place in the early 2000s 
under the Schröder government’s Hartz IV social welfare reforms which were intended to 
reduce federal spending and free up the labour market. The federal LGAs were united in their 
opposition to Hartz IV as they argued that the federal government’s demand forecasts for the 
new services were a huge underestimation. But the LGAs found themselves excluded from key 
federal financial negotiations, according to our interviews. The main leeway for LGAs to 
influence the federal legislative process was by lobbying federal actors. Lobbying efforts were 
particularly focused on federal government departments, and for the LGAs in the states on their 
respective state governments, in the hope that this would eventually influence the position 
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taken by the Federal Council. With only a procedural requirement in place for federal 
government departments to consult local government on federal policies, there were limited 
institutional safeguards in place to strengthen local interest representation at the federal level. 
Whilst the federal government made some concessions during the Hartz IV legislative process, 
our LGA interviewees stressed their inadequacy. Indeed, Hartz IV has created substantial 
financial pressures across local government, significantly increasing local debt (Boysen-
Hogrefe, 2014; De Widt, 2016; Hauser, 2014). It is clear that the federal government 
underestimated the local financial impact of social welfare legislation. However, as a German 
Federal Ministry of Finance official argued, it was up to the states to protect local government: 
 
When the federal government negotiates with the states, safeguarding local finances is 
not a primary concern. It is the states, of which the local level is part of, who have the 
main responsibility to watch over local level interests. 
 
Thus, the federal assumption is that the Federal Council, comprising state representatives, has 
the responsibility to represent, indirectly at least, local interests. Yet the federal LGAs 
emphasised that they found it very difficult to get the states to listen to their criticism of Hartz 
IV. It would seem, based on interviewees’ accounts, that party-political linkages were critical 
and the federal-state are stronger than state-local linkages. Federal ministers used party 
linkages to persuade state governments of the same party to support their policies. Thus, state 
governments, like NRW, accepted the federal government’s proposals. As an LGA interviewee 
observed, the states ‘failed to demonstrate the assertiveness required to protect the financial 
interests of their own local government sector’. 
More recently the institutional safeguards have improved, especially following the 
states’ adoption of the Connectivity Principle restricting the ability of state governments to 
decentralise unfunded tasks to local government. Following its introduction in NRW in 2004, 
NRW LGAs have successfully used the Connectivity Principle in several cases in the NRW 
state court to compel the state to reconsider its local funding procedures (e.g. 
Kinderförderungsgesetz in 2010). Although the Principle does not directly apply to federal 
legislation, it now provides an incentive for the states to be more assertive at the federal level 
in defending the financial interests of local government, as it is the states who will be held 
responsible, through the Connectivity Principle, if unfunded mandates are assigned to 
municipalities. The 2006 Federalism Reform I also prohibits the federal government from 
assigning new tasks directly to the local level. It now has to negotiate with the states which, 
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consequent on the state-level Connectivity Principles, are more sensitive to LGA demands. The 
federal response to local financial pressures has been mainly to re-federalize the ‘Basic 
insurance for pensioners’ from 2012. It also gave federal LGAs better representation in federal 
policymaking processes, such as requiring federal departments to consult LGAs on relevant 
legislative proposals (Henneke, 2012, p. 215). LGA leaders stressed that the Connectivity 
Principle was the most significant measure strengthening their position. Yet they emphasised 
that the Connectivity Principle has not fundamentally changed the German system, and 
provided less protection in practice than a formal institutional analysis would imply. Firstly, 
the Principle can intensify rather than reduce intergovernmental tensions, as state departments 
seek to work around rather than with local governments. An interviewee at NRW’s County 
Association recalls:  
 
The introduction of the Connectivity Principle has led to an almost phobia among some 
of NRW’s state departments against transferring any new tasks to the local sector. They 
prefer to work with their own agencies, as they reason working with ‘the local sector is 
too much of a hassle’. 
 
Secondly, the Principle applies only to new laws, and not retrospectively, so that municipalities 
have not obtained any relief from the financial burdens imposed by the pre-2004 social welfare 
legislation, especially Hartz IV. In addition, even though the NRW LGAs have successfully 
relied upon the Connectivity Principle in court procedures, in many other cases the NRW State 
Court has judged state funding to local government adequate ‘in light of the state’s own 
restricted budgetary space’ (NRW State Court, 2011).  
 
The Netherlands 
Dutch municipalities exist within a ‘small consensual–corporatist state, where decision-making 
is about “eternal” deliberation, consultation and compromising’ (Kickert, 2012, p. 300). The 
Dutch intergovernmental system emphasizes government policy on equality in public service 
provision (Goedhart, 1989, p. 680) and the convention is that central government avoids 
unilateral decisions affecting subnational interests. The Association of Dutch Municipalities 
(VNG) is a unified LGA, representing all 388 municipalities. Steen and Toonen (2010, p. 159) 
stress that the VNG is ‘an important partner in central-local consultation and negotiation’ and 
one of our interviewees described it as the second most influential Dutch lobby group after the 
Dutch Employers’ Federation. It has a budget of 111.1 million euros and significantly is heavily 
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dependent on central government funding (79.6 million euros (71.6%) with membership fees 
constituting just 18.6% of income (20.7m) and other revenues 9.7% (10.8m) (VNG, 2017).  
From an institutional perspective, the decentralized-unitary constitutional nature of the 
Dutch government system involves several formal and informal practices apparently 
favourable to local government interests and the negotiating position of the VNG. Firstly, 
general grant funding to local government is closely tied into the central government budget, 
by connecting general local government funding to the central government’s corrected net 
expenditure. This methodology ensures that the majority of local funding is shared equally with 
the central services if government expenditure increases, and it supposedly prevents local 
government from suffering disproportionately if it decreases. Although interviewees in the 
VNG recognised that the mechanism offers some protection for local funding, they were 
critical of central government’s decision to ‘switch it off’ during the three years following the 
financial crisis 2009-2011 (Rfv, 2012), with adverse consequences for local finances. 
A second intergovernmental tradition that seems to safeguard local government 
interests is the maximization of the maximum financial reduction considered to be permissible 
when central government implements changes in the distributional mechanisms of general 
grant funding (set at 15 euro per inhabitant, per year) (VNG, 2012, p. 3). Although this 
procedure protects the local level from absolute funding reductions, it provided limited 
protection during the negotiations on the Big Decentralizations, as decentralizations increase 
the overall size of local funding but often involve efficiency cuts which reduce the size of the 
budgetary transfer. As Dutch municipalities are generally expected to maintain comparable 
service levels after decentralization, and the forecasted efficiency gains of decentralizations 
often reflect optimistic assumptions, they have faced growing financial pressures. 
A third Dutch constitutional tradition that ostensibly strengthens local government’s 
position is legislation that has made the budgetary process more open. The Law on 
Intergovernmental Finances (1996) requires central government departments to attach to 
legislative proposals an appendix indicating the likely local, financial impact. The Interior 
Ministry monitors departmental compliance with this requirement. Although the principle has 
increased cost awareness amongst national policymakers of the subnational impact of proposed 
reforms, the practice often falls short of the principle, an Interior Ministry official:  
 
… it’s a kind of sport for departments to mirror the financial consequences of proposed 
reforms as favourable as possible to all actors, so it [drafting the financial appendix] 
doesn’t go well automatically. 
14 
 
 
The issue partly reflects the Interior Ministry’s loss of authority and capacity to evaluate 
effectively other departments’ financial impact assessments as it has been eclipsed by the big 
service departments and the Finance Ministry. VNG interviewees reflected that this loss of 
status made it sometimes more difficult to build political-bureaucratic coalitions favourable to 
local interests. For the VNG, this problem has been aggravated by strong competition from 
interest groups with a strong service rather than territorial focus. These service-oriented interest 
groups maintain strong links to the service departments, such as the association of Dutch health 
insurers that maintains strong links to the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. As they stress 
uniform nationwide service levels, the service-oriented interest groups clash with local 
government interest groups, as the VNG maintain the view that cost effective decentralization 
can only occur if subnational entities are equipped with sufficient implementation autonomy, 
a position fiercely opposed by non-territorial interest groups who fear widening inter-local 
differences in service levels. 
Beyond the Interior Ministry, other organisations including the independent Financial 
Relations Council, and the Bofv, a high level working group on intergovernmental financial 
relationships, strengthen the local government voice at the central level. Whilst interviewees 
emphasize that these organisations represent significant access points into national 
policymaking processes, the personal contacts of local government representatives, such as 
mayors, with central government policymakers, including government ministers were seen as 
more critical. The in practice central appointment of mayors and the high levels of rotation 
between local and national level politicians – in both directions – are more significant in 
ensuring that local views are included in central policymaking processes. However, it is a 
relatively narrow representation of local interests as it is often dominated by the voice of the 
big cities and the VNG leadership. The need to rebalance this interest representation has led to 
several initiatives to improve diversity in the association’s interest representation such as the 
formation of G32 as an association of midsize cities, and P10, a collaboration of large rural 
municipalities. Unusually, the Big Decentralizations negotiations saw the big cities siding with 
other municipalities in rejecting the initial agreement which the VNG leadership had reached 
with Cabinet. This interrupted a pattern in the VNG whereby large municipalities tend to 
endorse the VNG leadership in favouring decentralization often despite opposition from the 
smaller municipalities who fear increased financial burdens.  
Over recent years the key issues have been the ‘Big Decentralization’ programme and 
related local spending pressures. In 2011 the then Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition 
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government initiated the Big Decentralizations programme as a post-2008 austerity measure. 
Ministers sought savings of 6 billion euro in a budget of 15.6 billion euro by transferring three 
social welfare services, including youth care, special care and support for those at the bottom 
of the labour market. Notably these intergovernmental negotiations took almost four years 
before the responsibilities were decentralized in 2015. As the welfare tasks are decentralized 
and combined with major cuts, the consequences of decentralization have become a major local 
spending pressure. The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) evaluated 
previous decentralizations and showed that municipalities had responded to tighter budgets by 
reducing services for specific categories of citizens, particularly the disabled and elderly.  
During the Big Decentralizations negotiations, many municipalities raised concerns 
over the financial implications. Ministers could have pushed through the reforms without VNG 
support but they were unwilling to act without gaining local support. The first stage deal in 
2011 took six-months of negotiation between the VNG leadership and the Cabinet, but met 
fierce resistance from many municipalities which were unhappy with the VNG leadership’s 
position. They saw significant financial and operational risks, especially in the proposed labour 
market reforms. When the large cities criticized the VNG position and the agreement, the 
leadership put the agreement for approval to its members, but excluded the labour market 
reform agreement which was the most contentious. Although this amended version of the 
agreement received support from 86.6% of the municipalities, the Cabinet itself criticized the 
association’s decision to allow its members to vote on just one part of the agreement. The VNG 
leadership-membership divisions intensified again at a later stage of the reform process in 
2014, when 67% of the municipalities participating in the vote rejected another agreement 
reached between the association’s leadership and the Cabinet. A central government civil 
servant noted that at this point of the negotiations internal opposition against the VNG 
leadership had reached such a high level that: ‘We [central government] were holding the VNG 
in the air’. 
Traditionally, the VNG has strongly supported decentralization and the leadership 
advised the membership to vote for its agreement with the Cabinet. But the association’s own 
organizational interests fuelled the leadership-membership division. VNG officials expected to 
acquire a key role in coordinating the reform and receive significantly increased central 
government funding. Indeed, after 2015 the Big Decentralizations have significantly increased 
the VNG’s role with increased central funding to support its monitoring and support role (from 
17 million euro in 2012 to 35 million in 2015) (BZK, 2015). But many local level interviewees 
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criticized the VNG leadership for being co-opted by central government as they saw it pursuing 
its organizational interests rather than members’ interests. 
Partly because of membership resistance, the VNG leadership re-entered negotiations 
with central government in 2013, and was able to extract significant financial concessions from 
central government. For example, 200 million euro extra funding was made available to support 
the transition of tasks from the central to the local level (one-off funding), and around 325 
million euro extra funding annually for two of the major decentralized tasks (Wmo and PV 
budget) (VNG, 2013). However, the reform package eventually implemented was still 
perceived as containing substantial risks, with an analysis by the independent CPB concluding 
that they entail a risk that municipalities will provide ‘less of the decentralized services than 
socially desirable’ (CPB, 2015, p. 5). 
During the Big Decentralizations negotiations, the VNG only had a significant impact 
after it had been reined in by its members, and the association’s tougher negotiation approach 
led to substantial concessions from central government. It avoided co-optation despite the 
mechanisms for co-optation, such as increased central government financial support. 
Notwithstanding these concessions, the implications of the Big Decentralizations on the 
financial position of Dutch local government are highly uncertain, with some municipalities 
having reported substantial financial pressures in their newly acquired service areas (AEF, 
2017). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This conclusion will summarise the three cases and advance some generalisations about LGAs 
based around the three questions posed relating to (1) the role of constitutional institutions and 
traditions in protecting local government, (2) the dilemmas of collectively representing 
territorial heterogeneity and (3) how other IGR linkages, mainly the parties and professional-
bureaucratic channels, compete or complement LGAs. The Dutch VNG highlights the potential 
for, and limits of, central co-optation through a corporatist-partnership, in this case, 
underpinned by Dutch co-governance traditions. Central government support, especially as the 
main funder of the VNG plus central influence over mayoral appointments, reduced the VNG 
leaders’ dependence on the membership. The VNG’s political and bureaucratic leadership then 
developed their own interest in cooperating with the centre to increase the association’s income 
and responsibilities. However, this pursuit of the logic of influence during the Big 
Decentralizations was circumscribed by member municipalities which meant the leadership 
had to return to the centre to ask for further concessions.  
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In contrast, the English case illustrates how an LGA in a more pluralist arena, with 
fewer well-established conventions and institutional arrangements underpinning its position, 
has had to adapt to uneven access opportunities to central government which fluctuate 
significantly according to shifts in party control and ministerial style. The LGA political and 
official leadership has had to work hard to maintain close to 100% membership given the lack 
of a strong institutionalised relationship with the centre, its dependency on membership fees 
and the increasing assertiveness of powerful territorial interests within and outside the LGA, 
especially the big cities. Most recently the LGA political leadership has largely been a spectator 
to the introduction of the sub-regional mayoralties. It has tended to move towards a service 
bureau role under the pressure of these cleavages which suggests that the more pluralist the 
arena, the more likely that a LGA will operate as a service bureau. 
The German case shows how federal structures tend to crowd out or marginalize local 
government interests (Cigler, 2012, makes a similar point in the US) and how multiple levels 
complicate local government lobbying activities. The ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf, 1988), 
within the intergovernmental system involve bargaining among the states, rather than 
collaborative problem-solving, and inter-state bargaining marginalizes municipal interests at 
the federal level (cf. De Widt, 2016, p. 682). The federal LGAs have struggled to influence 
federally-driven reforms and have had to acquiesce, following intergovernmental pressures, in 
increased local debt. The case, too, illustrates the role of partisan factors as federal 
policymakers used political party links to steer the states and the Federal Council, so that the 
local government voice was incidentally marginalised at this level. Nonetheless, the 
Connectivity Principle and other state-level developments show how constitutional measures 
strengthened LGAs’ roles and relationships at state level, and so indirectly at federal level, 
although many of the key battles over unfunded mandates had already been lost by the time it 
was introduced.  
These cases indicate that LGAs can be significant actors at least part of the time. The 
Dutch case suggests that well-grounded constitutional and cooperative conventions can enable 
LGAs to mitigate, but seldom prevent, centrally-imposed reforms and draconian cutbacks. In 
particular, these conventions mean that it is difficult for central actors unilaterally to change 
the rules (but not unknown). Even so Dutch LGAs, and German LGAs, have faced significant 
challenges in limiting major direct and indirect cuts through burden-shifting. In the absence of 
such well-grounded conventions, English local government has endured considerably more 
reorganizations and severe cutbacks with limited consultation. One parliamentary report has 
considered a code to protect local government (PCRC, 2012). Even if a code providing strong 
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local government protections was introduced, it would remain a largely pious statement as it 
would be ungrounded in a wider system of established constitutional conventions of the type 
found in Germany and the Netherlands. Nonetheless, the position of English local government 
could be strengthened if funding mechanisms were more transparent and determined more 
independently. However, as the NRW’s experience illustrates, there is a trade-off between 
increased simplicity and responding to inter-local diversity and territorial inequalities.  
LGAs routinely enjoy easy access to key policymakers and are extensively consulted 
by them, all of which suggests that they have some influence. Their leaders would argue that 
they have occasionally deflected central policy initiatives inimical to local government (which 
is difficult to prove) and maintained pressure on central policymakers over many low profile 
issues – such as rubbish disposal, road maintenance and safer streets – which are vital public 
goods. Clearly their role and influence is externally limited by powerful central governments, 
or state governments, which are not only much better resourced but also have society-wide 
redistributive and regulatory perspectives and functions. LGAs have limited resources to 
challenge central government’s assessments of local need and face serious constraints given 
their need to manage diverse and multiple interests. They have to work within political arenas 
populated by powerful partisan and functional interests. Party affiliations and links can both 
support and undermine LGAs at different times in their struggle to represent topocratic 
interests. Functional interests, based in the big service central government departments and 
often closely integrated with local government services, also pose a serious challenge to bodies 
representing the territorial interests of local government. LGAs again have limited resources to 
challenge these functional interests, staffed by technocrats and professionals, and are wary of 
being coopted by them. Meanwhile, interior ministries and local government departments are 
weak allies as they have been eclipsed at the central level by the big service departments 
especially as service delivery issues and austerity have risen up the political agenda. This 
tension between territorial and functional interests is most evident in England as German 
cooperative federalist and Dutch co-governance institutions tend to act as countervailing forces 
to the centrifugal pressures of functional, service linkages.   
Finally, our research demonstrates the value of researching LGAs as a way of 
understanding the institutional dynamics and territorial tensions inherent in intergovernmental 
relations. LGAs are significant not just as key players in those relations and but also as telling 
indicators of the shifting balance of power between central and local governments, and no study 
of central-local relations should neglect these associations. As such further comparative 
research on LGAs promises to provide further vital insights into how central and local 
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policymakers seek to manage pressing contemporary territorial questions – such as how the 
interests of big cities can be balanced against those of smaller towns, urban areas against rural 
interests, and growing against declining areas.   
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